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Abstract. This paper provides an analysis of the way in which two foundational
principles of medical ethics–the trusted doctor and patient autonomy–can be under-
mined by the use of machine learning (ML) algorithms and addresses its legal sig-
nificance. This paper can be a guide to both health care providers and other stake-
holders about how anticipate and in some cases mitigate ethical conflicts caused by
the use of ML in healthcare. It can also be read as a road map as to what needs to
be done to achieve an acceptable level of explainability in an ML algorithm when
it is used in a healthcare context.
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Introduction
Machine Learning (ML) is used here to refer to a class of statistical models primarily
used to yield repeatable and accurate predictions [1]. ML models result from ‘learning’,
broadly understood, on large amounts of data. This learning process determines what the
model will be able to predict. Given this, a ML model becomes the basis for predictions
about features that were in the data from which it ‘learned’. For example, a ML model
that is trained with cardiograms can ‘learn’ to predict which cardiogram is associated
with heart disease, but may not ’learn’ what a healthy heart rate is.
ML can be used in any domain of inquiry where large amounts of data can be found,
including, but not limited to, all aspects of healthcare. This development can be attributed
to two independent factors: an increase in the availability of large health-related datasets,
on the one hand, and a decrease in the expense of the computationally intensive learn-
ing process, on the other. As central processing units in computers become cheaper and
faster, it takes less time and energy to generate a useful and accurate ML model.
Non-ML statistical modelling techniques used in healthcare can and often are used
to enable interpretations of data and to provide a basis for causal inference. The main
reason for this is that researchers can validate their interpretations of data by, for exam-
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ple, checking for statistical significance and then comparing their results with accepted
practice in their field. For example, a correlational model of cardiograms of people with
and without heart disease may tell researchers which features are relevant and significant
in contributing to its predictions. This is typically not something we can or even want to
do with ML models. The notion of statistical significance has little place in making sense
of why a particular ML model makes predictions the way it does.
In sum, ML is limited to those domains that can provide an adequately large and rich
dataset. The use of ML, however, comes with a trade-off. Typically an increased accuracy
of prediction coincides with a simultaneous increase in the opaqueness of the factors that
come to play a role in that accuracy. This means that robust ML models are unlikely to tell
us much about the factors, variables, patterns, and relationships that are responsible for
the predictions that the model makes. There is ongoing research [2], [3] into making ML
models interpretable and explainable, which, if successful, could be a straightforward
way to resolve the trade-off. Until that time comes, however, this particular feature of
ML raises significant ethical and legal concerns within the healthcare domain, especially
in contexts where transparency and explainability play a foundational role.
In this paper, we focus on two moral foundations that are especially important in the
healthcare domain: the position of the trusted doctor and respect for patient autonomy.
We focus on these two issues because they connect most obviously to established legal
frameworks within which healthcare professionals typically operate. Since obligations of
medicine are importantly distinct from the obligations of everyday morality, we ignore
the more general issues connected to the explainability of ML. In section 1 we provide
a brief review of the legal and ethical foundations of the notions of a trusted doctor
and patient autonomy. In section 2 we take up the moral and legal difficulties that ML
generates for the trust in doctors and patient autonomy. In section 3 we sketch some of
the methods that can be used to mitigate the problems we discuss in section 2.
1. The Reasonable Physician and Patient Standards in the Law and Medical
Ethics
Idealizations play an important role in common law. For example, when the issue under
consideration is someone’s intent, one way in which the law sees it being determined is
by examining the understanding of an idealized reasonable person. During this process,
consideration is given to all relevant circumstances of the case to determine what a rea-
sonable person would intend or do in these circumstances. Similar idealizations are used
in the medical context to determine whether there was informed consent and to ascertain
liabilty. It is an issue of ongoing debate in the ethics and law of medicine precisely which
pieces of information must be disclosed to patients in order to fulfill this commitment to
truth-telling and subsequently to avoid allegations of medical malpractice [4]–[6]. Some
matters are uncontroversial, for example, the most common and most serious risks of
undergoing or forgoing a treatment must be disclosed and explained. But it is practi-
cally impossible and probably ethically undesirable to disclose all relevant information
to patients before they make a medical decision.
In the U.S. two different legal and ethical standards dictate which information must
be disclosed to a patient in order for them to give informed consent to medical inter-
ventions or participate in clinical research: the reasonable physician (medical practice
or professional) standard and the reasonable patient (or person) standard [7], [8]. These
two standards provide different answers to the question: ’what information must be pro-
vided to a patient before they are capable of giving truly informed consent?’ The rea-
sonable physician standard answers it by referring to the broadly accepted professional
standards and practices relevant to the specific context. The reasonable patient standard
answers it by referencing what an average patient would want to know, find relevant to
their decision making, or be expected to be informed about.
In the context of informed consent to interventions or treatments, the reasonable
physician and reasonable patient standards create distinct challenges. The reasonable
patient standard generates problems connected to it being vague, since it assumes that
patients across demographic groups are sufficiently similar. This notion does not rely
on empirical evidence regarding patient preferences or expectations, so it is sometimes
difficult to imagine what the idealized person would want or expect to know about their
diagnosis. The problems with the reasonable physician standard are slightly different.
The standards of medical practice and thus what can be expected from a reasonable
physician is not constant over time or place, so what is expected of a physician is highly
dependant on context.
For example, in the United States for at least four decades there was professional
consensus that, with rare exceptions, competent patients must be informed of their diag-
nosis, if they wish to be. But a study in 1961 revealed that a vast majority of physicians
routinely witheld cancer diagnosis from patients [9]. Practice does not always follow the
standards set out by idealizations. A second shortcoming of this standard is that even a
high percentage of professional physicians can be mistaken, biased, or unaware, when
it comes to information that is relevant to patient decision making. This is unfortunate,
since the physician has to determine which information to provide to patients before ask-
ing them to decide on treatment or care. It is in these sorts of situations that the notion
of a reasonable physician is used when U.S. courts need to determine whether the physi-
cian satisfied standards of informed consent. Informed consent, which we turn to later,
is crucial to determine negligence and malpractice. A physician that did not abide by the
standard of informed consent may be liable.
The reasonable physician standard is used differently in other common law tradi-
tions, such as U.K. and Canada, and significantly different in civil law contexts. For ex-
ample, in Canada (except Quebec), doctors are legally required to answer all questions
posed by patients, including about benefits, risks, and treatment alternatives. In Aus-
tralia, the professional does not incur a liability in negligence, if it is established that ”the
professional acted in a manner that at the time the service was provided was widely ac-
cepted by peer professional opinion as competent professional practice” (Civil Liberties
Act of 2002, Section 5O). In the U.K., these issues are typically resolved be referring the
tort standard embodied in the Bolam Standard. On this standard, ”a doctor is not guilty
of negligence if he has acted in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a re-
sponsible body of medical men skilled in that particular art” (Bolam v Friern Hospital
Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 583). All of these common law standards are, to
some extent, idealizations of what a reasonable physician is expected to do, even though
their practical and legal bases are different. In the civil law tradition, we have examples
such as the la responsabilite civile (Code of Ethics of Physicians) in France, which is un-
equivocal in demanding that ”a doctor must in all circumstances be trustworthy and act
with integrity and devotion to duty, essential for the practice of medicine. Confidentiality
is a patient’s right. It is mandatory for all doctors as required by law” (Articles R.4127-3
and R.4127-4).
Zooming out from nation-specific legal instruments to the international level, the
medical profession has distinct mention in the 1948-2017 Declaration of Geneva, in the
1964 Declaration of Helsinki, as well in the 1997 Council of Europe Convention on Hu-
man Rights and Biomedicine, among others. Arguably, these international instruments,
like their nation-specific counterparts, embody at least in spirit two closely related foun-
dational principles of medical ethics: the trusted doctor [10], [11] and respect for pa-
tient autonomy, which is closely related to truth-telling and informed consent [12], [13].
Violating these two ethical principles will be, in many cases, also a violation of related
nation-specific and international legal standards that protect medical professionals and
patients. Therefore, focusing on the way in which ML will affect these two ethical prin-
ciples is a way of addressing possible legal consequences, without focusing on nation-
specific and international similarities and differences across legal contexts.
The trusted doctor principle is grounded in the claim that medicine has a distinct
set of moral responsibilities and physicians have a fiduciary duty to their patients [10],
[14]. For example, a doctor may be free to allocate attention and empathy to only those
people in their circle of intimates for whom they care, but in a healthcare setting they
are required to put personal preferences aside and allocate attention and care on the basis
of considerations like medical need and urgency [10], [14]. This centers the physician’s
obligation to earn trust and be trustworthy, as they are given a special set of rights and
privileges in society. In general, the medical notion of a patient’s trust in their doctor can
be understood as:
... an attitude of willingness to rely on another person or entity to perform actions that
benefit or protect oneself or one’s interests in a given sphere of activity, together with
a normative expectation: the person or entity should perform in a particular way[15,
p. 355].
Physicians are obligated to provide care in accordance with the principle of beneficence,
that is, to act for the benefit of the patient. Simultaneously, they are expected and obli-
gated to act in accordance with a wide range of other moral and professional commit-
ments, such as the commitment to staying up to date with respect to scientific develop-
ments in their field, transparency about the limitations of their expertise, respect for pa-
tient confidentiality, truth telling, and respect for patient autonomy and informed consent,
broadly construed.
The attitude of trust that many patients have in their physicians cannot be taken for
granted and is mediated by several factors. Research shows that patient characteristics
like race and socio-economic status impact their trust in physicians (c.f. Kennedy, Mathis
and Woods 2007 on urban African Americans trust in the health care system) as can
characteristics of the physician or the institutions they are embedded in. Patients who
believe that their physicians are being compensated based on the number of medical tests
they request or prescriptions they write in a managed care system are (unsurprisingly)
seen as less trustworthy [16]. The introduction of new technologies in medical practice
is not by any means a novel phenomenon and how new technologies impact patient trust
is a perennial issue [17]. For example, Promberger and Baron [18] found that patients
have greater trust in and are more likely to follow medical recommendations provided to
them by a physician rather than by a computer.
The other foundational moral commitment of medicine that is embodied in legal
instruments and that we discuss here is patient autonomy, which includes the interrelated
ethical principles of truth-telling and informed consent [12], [13]. Informed consent is
central to many of legal instruments discussed already, but it also has a special place
within medical ethics, especially when coupled with respect for patient autonomy on
which it arguably depends. One way in which requirement of respect for autonomy or,
more broadly, respect for persons, is operationalized in the medical context is through the
requirement that physicians obtain consent or refusal for any medical intervention they
consider from the patient, assuming that the patient has decisional capacity. The closely
related legal concept of patient competence is determined on the basis of four criterion
[19], [20]. When making a medical decision patients must be able 1) ”communicate
a choice;” 2) ”Understand the relevant information;” 3) ”Appreciate the situation and
its consequences;” and 4) ”Reason about treatment options” [19, p. 1836]. In order for
patients to be able to demonstrate these capacities physicians must provide them with the
relevant information in a form that the patient is able to understand and then follow up
with an assessment of their understanding through the use of specific questions, such as:
”Why do you think your doctor has [or I have] recommended this treatment?” (Ibid p.
1836).
Respect for autonomy requires that patients have the opportunity to make their own
medical decisions which are consistent with their own values, preferences, and under-
standing of a good life, even when these decisions may conflict with what others, in-
cluding the medical team, see as in their best interests. Given this, most major medical
interventions require that the patient be given adequate and truthful information about
the risks, benefits, and alternative treatments and be given opportunity to discuss and
ask questions about their treatment. This means that the requirements of truth-telling and
informed consent are to some extent derivative from the requirement of respect for indi-
vidual autonomy–hence the aforementioned inter-relatedness of these principles. Truth-
telling in medicine makes it possible for patients to be able to make their own decisions
about matters of their health care. Deception in medicine is a form of expressing a lack of
respect for the rationality and autonomy of the patient, which interferes with a patient’s
ability to exercise his or her decisional capacity.
2. The Effect of ML on the Trusted Doctor and Patient Autonomy Principles
A crucial question for the ethical use of ML in medicine is whether or not patients’ at-
titude of trust will be undermined as it becomes difficult or impossible to explain to the
patient or their family member what lies behind a diagnosis or recommendation of course
of treatment. And once this question is answered, we also need to answer a follow-up
question: Will the special set of rights and privileges that medical professionals are en-
dowed with on the basis of that trust appear unwarranted from the patient’s perspective
as a result? Two considerations suggest that such a situation is likely and that the use
of ML in medicine may undermine patient trust. The first has to do with responsibil-
ity/explainability and the second to do with perceived objectivity/bias.
To maintain trust physicians must be able to unpack their diagnoses and recommen-
dations in lay person’s terms and create a shared understanding of the medical facts. This
allows patients to make informed and autonomous decisions about the course of their
care. Simultaneously, it is during this process that patient and physician take shared re-
sponsibility for the course of care [21]. In order for trust to be maintained physicians
must be able to explain the role that ML-models or algorithms played in the diagnosis or
recommendation. They must also communicate and be justified in communicating that
the doctor is ultimately responsible for a patient’s evaluation or care, despite the role of
a black-box algorithm. If this is not possible, in time the trust that governs the doctor-
patient relationship will be undermined and the expectations that patients have of their
doctors will be changed. There is now significant evidence that trust is indeed under-
mined by computer systems in the medical context, if such explanations are not provided
[22]. ML-models will similarly be unable aid patients in a way that keeps them informed
in the ethically significant sense.
Second, physicians are expected to treat their patients with nonjudgmental regard
and in a manner free from personal bias [23]. This is not easily accomplished by physi-
cians and there is significant evidence that they fail to live up to this obligation when
treating, for example, patients with eating disorders [24] or patients who are obese [25].
Although physicians are imperfect in setting aside biases and personal preferences when
delivering care, they are bound by a moral duty to strive to do so. If physicians fail to
prevent their biases from impacting their perceptions and treatment of their patients, the
expanded use of diagnostic and treatment recommending technology seems like an ap-
pealing way to ameliorate this problem. Machines are, after all, objective, their results
free from interpretation and associated human frailties, one might think.
This sort of techno-optimism is potentially problematic because, somewhat fa-
mously now, ML algorithms can themselves become biased in a variety of ways [26]–
[28]. We already now know cases of ML algorithms in healthcare that turned out to be
biased [29]–[31]. From the perspective of clinical justice this is a problem in and of itself
that is likely to compound preexisting physician biases, rather than counteract them. As
the existence of bias in ML-aided healthcare becomes widely known there is a further
risk that patient trust in its recommendations will also be undermined. This presents a
troubling dilemma for the project of maintaining the trusted doctor standards. To disclose
to patients the extent to which ML-aided healthcare is subject to bias undermines trust in
the system as a whole, but to fail to disclose these limitations may violate the obligations
of truth telling and robust informed consent.
The legal consequences of undermining the trusted doctor standard must be care-
fully considered and this is outside the scope of the present article. Regarless, we can
here at least focus on the legal basis for the final word in diagnosis and treatment rec-
ommendations, which lies with medical professionals precisely because of the privileged
epistemic and moral position that they have within that domain. When the epistemic and
moral bases for that position are undermined, we can expect the legal basis to be sim-
ilarly undermined in time. Someone that does not or cannot fulfill an obligation to do
something, eventually is relieved of that obligation, all things being equal. This in turn
would pose a fundamental challenge to medical moral responsibility and to the way that
the legal system deals with malpractice, patient death, and liability in cases of disagree-
ment among medical professionals. In all of these cases, the medical professional’s au-
thority and protection under law will be diminished or disappear altogether, as a result
of the diminishing of the expectations on their performing their duty to explain things
to patients. The remaining question would be then to assign responsibility to someone
when things go awry.
It is worthwhile noting here that there are related discussions of the ways in which
the introduction of ML into new spheres of human activity (e.g. self driving cars, surgical
robots, or automated loan eligibility assessment) impacts responsibility attribution [32]–
[35]. Troubles with assigning responsibility in a world full of automation and ML is not
unique to healthcare. In those other domains the question of who to blame when things
go awry is far from being solved. We can also expect medical professionals to be put
in an uncomfortable position to have to justify their diagnoses or treatment decisions
in cases where they themselves cannot state reasons or explain the performance of an
ML algorithm. At best, medical professionals will have to offer post hoc rationalizations
that the performance of the ML model is in line with what they would have decided
independently as an appropriate course of action themselves.
Similarly to the requirement of the trusted doctor, it is difficult to fulfill the patient
autonomy requirement, if the answers to questions about treatment or diagnosis are in
principle difficult or altogether impossible to give. To see this consider a medical pro-
fessional that answers questions about the risks and benefits of treatment with only pre-
dictions of success or failure, rather than with reasons why these predictions are as low
or high as they are. A patient that asks for such reasons and does not get answers will
not be in a position to have informed consent to the treatment. Similarly, a medical pro-
fessional that fails to answer questions about alternative treatments would be failing to
respect patient autonomy. That choice is effectively not given to the patient. Finally, a
medical professional that cannot or will not discuss possible manners of treatment, but
merely provides a recommendation, will be violating the requirement of truth-telling. An
opaque ML-aided algorithm that recommends or diagnoses in healthcare will be just like
that medical professional, unable to provide answers to questions about risks and ben-
efits, reasons for predictions, or alternative treatments. This situation threatens respect
for patient autonomy by effectively removing a patient’s decisional capacity from the
calculus that determines courses of treatment and care.
Removing patient decisions from that calculus can be legally significant. In Canada,
for example, doctors are legally required to answer all questions posed by patients, in-
cluding about benefits, risks, and treatment alternatives. Similar laws can be found in the
European Union and the United States. It is simply not clear how these legal require-
ments of informed consent doctrines can be met in good faith when ML-aided health-
care interventions or diagnoses are involved. Medical professionals cannot be expected
to understand the operation of an ML-model when they are in principle opaque, even
to the computer scientists that may be ’teaching’ them to recognize patterns. Again, at
best, medical professionals can offer post hoc rationalizations of the operation of the
ML-model, assuming that it is doing what they would do, but without ever knowing that
it actually does so.
The legal consequences of undermining patient autonomy, as with the trusted doctor
standard, are likely to be profound. The professional and legal obligations that doctors
have with respect to patients will likely come under pressure. In a legal context, a doc-
tor’s answer to a patient’s question that cites the opaqueness of an ML model may be in
violation of the requirements of informed consent, effectively putting in question a diag-
nosis that is responsible for a possible later mistake or simply by ignoring what a patient
may find particularly important in their medical situation. Again, an answer that simply
assumes that the ML model is doing what a doctor would do is a misrepresentation that
may itself be in violation of the legal standard for evidence. Evidence that, say, a doctor
provided informed consent in a way ’I-know-not-how’ is setting the bar for admissibility
extremely low.
To sum up, the two foundational principles of medical ethics, the trusted doctor and
patient autonomy, are undermined by the opaqueness of ML-aided medicine. If these
principles are undermined, then we can expect significant downstream conflicts with
international and nation-specific legal standards that govern the the medical profession.
In particular, the legal basis for informed consent, liability, and standard of malpractice
will be out of sync with the reality of day-to-day doctor-patient interactions. Physicians
will not be in a position to live up to the standards of the trusted doctor standard that
is required of them to secure authority in diagnosis and consent. Furthermore, patients
will have their autonomy challenged by physicians that are either unable to tell them
the actual basis for diagnoses or treatment recommendations or will outright misinform
them about that basis. The remaining question is how to deal with these consequences,
especially since ML-aided medicine is already here.
3. Three Ways Forward for Machine Learning in Healthcare
Using ML in a medical setting is bound to have a positive effect in a number of areas, in-
cluding effectiveness of diagnostics, decreases in cost, and better resource management.
These positives are in danger of being outweighed by the negative consequences that
arise from the nature of ML technology and the downstream effects of its widespread
use. Among these is the already mentioned lack of transparency inherent in ML models,
but also the use of massive amounts of private data to ‘teach’ ML models, and finally
the possible introduction of biases into the predictions that ML models make. Here we
discuss three ways of resolving problems caused by the lack of transparency, without
addressing these other potential problems: (1) saliency methods, (2) limiting the role of
ML to specific domains of healthcare where its lack of explainability does not undermine
ethical foundations or legal norms, or (3) changing the reasonable patient and reasonable
physician standards. This list is not meant to be exhaustive.
1) Saliency methods analyze a ML model that has already ’learned’ to recognize
patterns in an image by piecemeal subtracting parts of an image until the part most rel-
evant to the classification and/or prediction is found. This process can be repeated to
obtain a ranking of parts of an image that can then comprise something very close to
an explanation as to why the image was classified in the way that it was. At that point,
medical professionals can also provide something like reasons to the diagnosis that are
based on the ranking, if asked to do so by the patient. Saliency methods for generating
explainable ML models may work whenever images are involved. This is by no means
exhaustive of the possible ways in which ML diagnostics can be made explainable, but
is the one that most obviously connects to healthcare diagnostics that use images.
There are two problems with the saliency approach. First, it is not generalizable to
all areas of healthcare and specifically to those that do not rely on images. Cardiograms,
X-rays, MRIs, or just photographs may all be essential for diagnosis, but they are not
always relevant to the recommendations that a medical professional ultimately makes
with respect to treatment or care. There are also a variety of diagnostics that do not
rely on imagining. Second, saliency has recently come under pressure as a method of
explaining the performance of ML [36]. It turns out that that two distinct ML models may
perform identically under the same conditions, which would likely generate disparate
explanations via saliency for the same performance. What this means, is that explanations
via saliency can be a dime a dozen, depending on the model that happens to be used–
not something that a patient or doctor are likely to accept as an accaptable standard of
explainability.
(2) The most drastic option and perhaps also the easiest way to deal with the prob-
lems of ML in context of healthcare is to advocate for strict legal regulations both at a na-
tional level and internationally. In cases where the use of ML may directly undermine the
doctor-patient relationship or undermine legal standards for informed consent, it should
not be used, full stop. One good example of a context where such a limitation may be
particularly important is in diagnostic algorithms that take disparate data about a large
number of people and construct a model that can predict the presence of early stages of
a chronic degenerative disease, such as Alzheimer’s Disease or multiple sclerosis. While
undoubtedly such a tool could be useful in a non-clinical setting to nudge people to seek
physician-assisted diagnosis, it should under no circumstances be used instead of such
a diagnosis or in conjunction with it. Doing so opens up a slew of moral and legal dif-
ficulties, not limited to those outlined in the two sections above. The main problem of
the regulative approach is that enforcement of laws that regulate ML-aided medicine is
likely to be extremely difficult internationally, especially in an era of medical tourism.
3) The third option is to reassess and change the reasonable patient and reasonable
doctor standards in such a way that the idealization that are based on them are sensi-
tive to the advent of ML-aided medicine. We cannot offer speculations about what these
changes could entail–this is work for legal scholars working within specific legal con-
texts. However, this article sketches what we hope are useful guidelines and framing
conditions that such speculations could follow. First, the reasonable doctor cannot be ex-
pected to explain the actual basis of an ML-aided advice and a reasonable patient cannot
expect to receive such information from their physician. Second, attempts by physicians
to justify ML-based advice or diagnoses on the basis of what they assume they would
have done themselves are dangerous and should be avoided. Thirdly, patients and physi-
cians should be vigilant about the potential biases that are at the heart of the diagnoses
and advice provided by ML-aided medicine. Any reasonable idealization that takes into
account the trusted doctor standard and patient autonomy should have room for flagging
potential hidden biases that drive ML-aided medicine, in lieu of evidence to the contrary.
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